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Abstract
The axiom of recovery, while capturing a cen-
tral intuition regarding belief change, has been
the source of much controversy. We argue briefly
against putative counterexamples to the axiom—
while agreeing that some of their insight de-
serves to be preserved—and present additional
recovery-like axioms in a framework that uses
epistemic states, which encode preferences, as
the object of revisions. This provides a frame-
work in which iterated revision becomes possible
and makes explicit the connection between iter-
ated belief change and the axiom of recovery. We
provide a representation theorem that connects
the semantic conditions that we impose on iter-
ated revision and the additional syntactical prop-
erties mentioned. We also show some interest-
ing similarities between our framework and that
of Darwiche-Pearl [4]. In particular, we show
that the intuitions underlying the controversial
(C2) postulate are captured by the recovery ax-
iom and our recovery-like postulates (the latter
can be seen as weakenings of (C2).
1 Introduction
A particularly simple sequence of belief change in reason-
ing agents is that of giving up and then adopting the same
belief (“I believed I had money for the movies, but then
realized I had left my wallet at home. However, a few min-
utes later, I discovered a twenty in my pocket and regained
my belief that I had enough money for the movies”). The
axiom of recovery in the AGM framework [1] attempts to
place a rationality constraint on the form of such a change.
It states that expansion by a belief recovers any beliefs lost
by the previous contraction by that belief. The status of
the axiom of recovery has been a source of much con-
troversy in belief revision [6, 7, 8, 11]. There are well-
known counterexamples to recovery, with the most con-
vincing ones amongst these being Hansson’s Cleopatra and
George-the-criminal examples [7, 9]. The following is a
slightly amended version of the former:
I believe that ‘Cleopatra had a son’ (φ) and that
‘Cleopatra had a daughter’ (ψ), and thus also that
‘Cleopatra had a child’ (φ∨ψ). Then I receive in-
formation that Cleopatra had no children, which
makes me give up my belief in φ ∨ ψ. But then I
am told that Cleopatra did have children, and so
I add φ ∨ ψ. But I should not regain my belief in
either ψ or φ as a result.
One response to this situation is to isolate a class of be-
lief change operators that do not satisfy recovery i.e., the
so-called withdrawal operators [12]. We do not adopt this
approach for a couple of reasons. Firstly, withdrawal op-
erators violate the principle of minimal change [9]. As an
example, consider the operator
.
− defined as follows (K is a
belief set closed under logical consequence, α an arbitrary
epistemic input): if α 6∈ K , then K .− α = K , otherwise,
K
.
− α = Cn(∅). A fundamental intuition behind minimal
contraction, the principle of core-retainment1, is only satis-
fied by withdrawal operators if they satisfy the recovery ax-
iom as well. This should reinstate our faith in the recovery
axiom since it is hard to find a satisfactory alternative for-
malization of the intuition that beliefs that do not contribute
to K implying α should be retained in K
.
− α. So, while
the counterexamples do tickle our intuitions, it is equally
the case that there is an important intuition about rational
belief change that the recovery postulate captures. Indeed,
the recovery postulate is best thought of as a version of the
1The principle of core-retainment states that if β ∈ K and
β 6∈ K
.
− α then there is a set K′ such that K′ ⊆ K and that
α 6∈ Cn(K′) but α ∈ Cn(K′ ∪ {β}); it requires of an excluded
sentence β that it in some way contribute to the implication of α
from K.
principle of minimal change: so much of the original belief
state is retained on contraction that the original belief state
can simply be restored on adopting the same belief. Our
approach to this situation is that even if the original postu-
late is rejected as being too permissive, some recovery like
postulates must constrain belief revision if the principle of
minimal change is to be taken seriously. Furthermore, re-
covery follows from other highly plausible postulates such
as closure, inclusion, vacuity, success, extensionality and
core-retainment [9]. Significantly, there is a clear and inti-
mate connection between iterated revision and the recovery
axiom: we can view the axiom as specifying the form of
the iterated revision that should take place when contract-
ing and revising by the same belief. In what follows, we
will make this connection clearer.
But what about the counterexamples? Surely, they point to
counterintuitive scenarios arising from the adoption of the
recovery axiom? We argue that, underlying these examples
is an assumption that information leading to the specified
sequence of contraction and expansion is not received from
the same source. That is, our claim is that recovery should
always hold when restricted to the case where information
is obtained from the same source, but that it need not hold
when information is obtained from different sources. Con-
sider the Cleopatra counterexample. The agent believes
both φ and ψ originally, and as a result is committed to the
belief that φ∨ψ. Now the agent receives information to the
effect that ¬(φ ∨ ψ). Crucially, what is left out of this ex-
ample is details about the sources of the epistemic inputs.
If source S1 provides the reasons for believing ¬(φ ∨ ψ)
and source S2 provides the reason for believing φ∨ ψ then
it makes sense to think that the agent does not recover its
original beliefs in φ or ψ. However, if it is the same source
that provides information on both ¬(φ∨ψ) and φ∨ψ, then
why should the agent not regain its belief in φ and ψ? After
all, source S1 provided the reason for the agent dropping
its belief in φ and ψ in the first place. If it then supplies
information to the contrary, the agent’s reasons for drop-
ping those beliefs have been negated, and it should regain
its original beliefs. To do otherwise would be counterintu-
itive. If however it is another source that provides the new
information, then the agent’s original reasons for contract-
ing by φ and ψ remain unaffected and there is no reason
for it to start believing φ or ψ again. (For a similar though
crucially different response see [15]).
The issue of what happens when information is obtained
from different sources is interesting in its own right, and
deserves to be treated separately. In general our attitude
is that the intuitions behind the recovery axiom are worth
capturing: it attempts to place rational constraints on what
happens when we revise and contract by the same formula.
This sort of belief change is commonplace and must be
handled by any adequate formal framework.
1.1 Our Proposal
We will consider versions of postulates in the same spirit
as recovery. We argue that to do so, a shift to belief change
on epistemic states, in the Darwiche-Pearl spirit is neces-
sary, since we need a framework in which to talk about
iterated revision. Cantwell [3] also provides recovery-like
properties in the context of iterated revision, but these how-
ever restate recovery itself in terms of revision (where con-
tracting with α is replaced by a revision with ¬α). This is
done to show that the counterexamples to recovery are not
only a criticism of AGM contraction (as has been argued in
the past), but also a criticism of AGM revision. Cantwell
goes on to show that examples similar to the Cleopatra and
George-the-criminal examples can be constructed for iter-
ated revision as well.
While adopting the representational framework of epis-
temic states, we do not accept all the Darwiche-Pearl pos-
tulates. There is sufficient debate in the belief revision lit-
erature on the appropriateness of these postulates. In prin-
ciple, though, we are of the opinion that the 3rd and 4th
Darwiche-Pearl postulates are valid. Like others we feel
that the 2nd postulate is too strong. The results in this pa-
per provide a weaker, and, we think, acceptable alternative
to the 2nd postulate. We are also of the opinion that the 1st
Darwich-Pearl postulate is too strong ([13] provides exam-
ples to back up this claim). We adopt the basic setting in
which belief change is performed on epistemic states, from
which a total preorder on valuations and a knowledge base
can be extracted. We provide a set of reformulated AGM
postulates for belief change on epistemic states and insist
on these.
We present some recovery-like postulates, as well as re-
strictions on the way in which the orderings extracted from
epistemic states may be modified when revision and con-
traction take place, and provide a representation theorem
that connects the recovery-like postulates and the postu-
lates on orderings. It turns out that the recovery-like pos-
tulates, when combined, can be thought of as a weakened
version of the (C2) postulate of Darwiche-Pearl. This is
brought out clearly when the postulates on orderings are
considered. The link between recovery and the (C2) postu-
late is interesting and surprising. This makes it possible to
think of (C2) as having overstated the case and of the re-
covery postulate and our weakenings as having addressed
its problems.
1.2 Notation and basic definitions
We assume a finitely generated propositional language
L closed under the usual propositional connectives and
equipped with a classical model-theoretic semantics; the
constants ⊤,⊥ are in L. V is the set of valuations of L
and M(α) is the set of models of α ∈ L. Classical en-
tailment is denoted by |=. Roman letters, p, q, r, . . . denote
propositional atoms; Greek letters α, β, . . . stand for arbi-
trary formulas. We reserve the letter Φ to denote epistemic
states. MΦ(α) denotes the minimal models of α in the
total preorder on valuations associated with the epistemic
state Φ.
Definition 1 Associated with an epistemic stateΦ is a total
preorder on valuations Φ, and a knowledge base K(Φ).
MΦ(α) denotes the minimal models of α in the total pre-
order on valuations. The knowledge base associated with
the epistemic state is obtained by considering the minimal
models in Φ i.e., M(K(Φ)) =MΦ(⊤).
φ represents the set of all wffs entailed by φ (the theory
obtained from the set of minimal models in Φ). Observe
that the knowledge bases extracted from Φ are all logically
equivalent. We will often abuse notation by using K(Φ)
to refer to the the knowledge base extracted from Φ. The
intention is that K(Φ) is some canonical representative of
all the knowledge bases extracted from Φ.
1.3 The reformulated AGM postulates
In the reformulated postulates below, ∗ and
.
− are be-
lief change operations on epistemic states, not knowledge
bases. So ∗ takes an epistemic state and a sentence and pro-
duces an epistemic state. For
.
− and ∗ to satisfy the AGM
postulates means that they satisfy the reformulated AGM
postulates which apply to epistemic states, not knowl-
edge bases. The reformulated AGM postulates guarantee
a unique extracted knowledge base when revision or con-
traction is performed i.e., the lowest level of valuations in
the resulting epistemic state is fixed. What is not fixed is
how to order the remaining valuations. Note that the object
of revision is the epistemic state, but in stating the postu-
lates we specify the form of the knowledge base extracted
from the epistemic state. Here are the reformulated AGM
postulates. First contraction:
• (Φ−1): K(Φ− α) = Cn(K(Φ− α))
• (Φ−2): K(Φ− α) ⊆ K(Φ)
• (Φ−3): If α /∈ K(Φ) then K(Φ− α) = K(Φ)
• (Φ−4): If 6|= α then α /∈ K(Φ− α)
• (Φ−5): If α ≡ β then Φ− α = Φ− β
• (Φ−6): If α ∈ K(Φ) then K(Φ) ⊆ (K(Φ− α)) + α
• (Φ−7): K(Φ− α) ∩K(Φ− β) ⊆ K(Φ− (α ∧ β))
• (Φ−8): If β /∈ K(Φ−(α∧β)) thenK(Φ−(α∧β)) ⊆
K(Φ)− β
In what follows, we will be particularly interested in the
relationship between K(Φ ∗ α − α) and K(Φ). We will
show that equality between the two sides conflicts with the
reformulated AGM postulates but does hold under some
conditions.
The intuitions corresponding to the postulates are roughly
the same as those underlying the original AGM postulates.
For example, (Φ−1) states that the knowledge base associ-
ated with the revised epistemic state is closed under logical
consequence. (Φ−5) states that contracting by logically
equivalent formulas results in the same epistemic state.
This particular postulate highlights a difference between
the original AGM postulates and our reformulations. The
original AGM postulate requires the belief set after revision
to be the same after revisions by logically equivalent for-
mulas, whereas we require that if two epistemic states are
the same, then revisions by logically equivalent formulas
should result in the same epistemic state. This is crucially
different from merely requiring that the knowledge base as-
sociated with the epistemic state be the same (such a refor-
mulation of the original AGM axioms by Darwiche-Pearl is
responsible for making (C2) compatible with them). Note
that we include the recovery axiom above.
The following are the reformulatedreformulated AGM pos-
tulates for revision:
• (Φ∗1) K(Φ ∗ α) = Cn(K(Φ ∗ α))
• (Φ∗2) α ∈ K(Φ ∗ α)
• (Φ∗3) K(Φ ∗ α) ⊆ K(Φ) + α
• (Φ∗4) If ¬α /∈ K(Φ) then K(Φ) + α ⊆ K(Φ ∗ α)
• (Φ∗5) If α ≡ β then Φ ∗ α = Φ ∗ β
• (Φ∗6) ⊥ ∈ K(Φ ∗ α) iff |= ¬α
• (Φ∗7) K(Φ ∗ (α ∧ β)) ⊆ K(Φ ∗ α) + β
• (Φ∗8) If ¬β /∈ K(Φ∗α) thenK(Φ∗α)+β ⊆ K(Φ∗
(α ∧ β))
As with the contraction postulates, the intuitions corre-
sponding to the postulates are roughly the same as those un-
derlying the original AGM postulates. For example, (Φ∗1)
states that the knowledge base associated with the revised
epistemic state is closed. (Φ∗6) states that an inconsistent
knowledge base only results when revising by contradic-
tions (note the modified (Φ ∗ 5) postulate as well).
For the sake of completeness, we include the Darwiche-
Pearl postulates for iterated revision [4] reformulated for
our framework. In the four postulates below ◦ is the up-
date operator, α, µ, represent new epistemic inputs and Φ
represents an epistemic state.
(C1) If α |= µ, then K(Φ ◦ µ ◦ α) = K(Φ ◦ α).
(C2) If α |= ¬µ, then K(Φ ◦ µ ◦ α) = K(Φ ◦ α).
(C3) If K(Φ ◦ α) |= µ, then K(Φ ◦ µ ◦ α) |= µ.
(C4) If K(Φ ◦ α) 6|= ¬µ, then K(Φ ◦ µ ◦ α) |= µ.
The postulate (C1) is a more powerful version of the (Φ∗7)
and (Φ ∗ 8) postulates (it implies them); it states that when
two pieces of information (one more specific than the other)
arrive, the first is made redundant by the second. (C2)
says that when two contradictory epistemic inputs arrive,
the second one prevails; the second evidence alone yields
the same belief state. Here the prima facie connection with
recovery should be obvious; for the basic form of the re-
covery axioms deals with ‘contract by α and then expand
by α’ while (C2) deals with ‘revise by α and then revise by
(effectively) ¬α’. The latter is clearly stronger. (C3) says
that a piece of evidence µ should be retained after accom-
modating more recent evidence α that entails µ given the
current belief state. (C4) simply says that no epistemic in-
put can act as its own defeater. Arlo-Costa and Parikh [2]
and Lehmann [10] have critically commented on (C2) as
have Freund and Lehmann [5] who have shown that it is in-
consistent with the original AGM axioms for belief sets (as
is the weaker axiom, C2′ proposed in Nayak et. al. [14]).
This last objection, as noted above, is no longer a problem
when the postulates are reformulated for epistemic states.
2 The new recovery postulates
In this section we provide additional recovery-like postu-
lates and then provide a semantic condition that provides
the means with which to carry out iterated revision. These
additional properties can be viewed as desirable properties
for iterated revision and cover a variety of situations, rang-
ing from sequences of revisions and contractions by the
same formula to sequences of revisions and contractions
by a formula and its negation. In particular these properties
describe the conditions under which we can expect stabil-
ity or minimal loss of beliefs in the original epistemic state.
Note that in all of these properties the sequence of belief
changes reverses that in the original formulation of the re-
covery axiom where contraction is followed by expansion.
Stating the postulates in this form enables the connection
with iterated revision to become clear since it is in the case
of revision followed by contraction that a notion of iterated
revision is necessary (in the original formulation of the re-
covery axiom, expansion is equivalent to revision thus ob-
viating the need for a framework that requires iteration). In
the postulates we make the implicit assumption that infor-
mation is received from the same source.
• (R1) K(Φ ∗ α− α) ⊆ K(Φ− α)
• (R2) α,¬α /∈ K(Φ) implies K(Φ) ⊆ K(Φ ∗ α− α)
• (R3) α /∈ K(Φ) implies K(Φ) ⊆ K(Φ ∗ α ∗ ¬α)
• (R4) α ∈ K(Φ) implies K(Φ− α) ⊆ K(Φ ∗ α− α)
(R1) says that the result of revising an epistemic state and
then contracting by the same formula is always contained
in the knowledge base obtained after simply contracting
by the same formula. (If I add the belief that Cleopatra
has children and then contract by this belief, the resul-
tant knowledge base should be contained in the knowledge
base obtained by my simply contracting by the belief that
Cleopatra has children). (R2) says that if neither a formula
nor its negation are in the knowledge base associated with
an epistemic state then the original base will be contained
in that obtained after revision and contraction by the same
formula. (R3) says that if a piece of information is not con-
tained in the knowledge base associated with an epistemic
state, then a revision by that formula followed by its nega-
tion will always include the original knowledge base. (R4)
says that if a formula is contained in the original knowledge
base then contracting by the same formula will produce a
knowledge base that is contained in one obtained by revis-
ing and contracting by the same formula.
The following additional properties further place condi-
tions on recovery like situations:
• (R5) K(Φ ∗ α− α) ⊆ K(Φ)
• (R6) α /∈ K(Φ) implies K(Φ) ⊆ K(Φ ∗α−α ∗ ¬α)
• (R7) ¬α ∈ K(Φ) implies K(Φ) ⊆ K(Φ ∗ α− α)
• (R8) α ∈ K(Φ) implies K(Φ) ⊆ K(Φ ∗ α− α ∗ α)
• (R9) α,¬α /∈ K(Φ) implies K(Φ−α) ⊆ K(Φ ∗α−
α)
(R5) says that the knowledge base obtained by revising
by an input and then contracting by it is contained in
the knowledge base associated with the original epistemic
state. (R6) says that if a belief is not contained in the orig-
inal knowledge base, then the knowledge base is contained
in the result of revising by a formula, contracting it and
then revising by its negation. (R7) says that if a belief is not
contained in the original knowledge base, then the original
knowledge base is contained in that obtained after revising
and contracting by its negation. (R8) says that if a belief is
contained in the original knowledge base, then that belief
will be preserved under a sequence of revisions which be-
gin with revision followed by contraction and then revision.
(R9) says that if the original knowledge base is agnostic
about a particular belief then contracting by that belief will
result in a knowledge base that is contained in one obtained
by revising and then contracting by that belief.
Observation 1
1. (R3) holds because K(Φ) is consistent.
2. (R9) follows from (R2).
3. (R5) follows from (R1) and the reformulated AGM
postulates.
4. (R6) is the same as (R3), given the reformulated AGM
postulates.
5. (R7) contradicts (Φ− 2) and (Φ ∗ 2).
6. (R1) follows from (R5) if α /∈ K(Φ).
7. (R8) follows from the reformulated AGM postulates.
The reformulated AGM postulates for epistemic states and
our additional recovery postulates, in our opinion, provide
a comprehensive framework for iterated revision which
does justice to the intuitions expressed in the original re-
covery axiom. One of our stated aims is to link up K(Φ ∗
α − α) and K(Φ). We do this via (R2), (R4), (R5), (R7)
and (R8). And it is (R7) which contradicts the reformulated
AGM postulates, as we have seen. Also, (R8) follows from
AGM anyway. Another way to put it: if α,¬α /∈ K(Φ)
then K(Φ) = K(Φ ∗ α − α). If ¬α ∈ K(Φ) then AGM
prevents K(Φ) = K(Φ ∗ α − α). If α ∈ K(Φ) then,
since α /∈ K(Φ ∗α−α) by AGM, it is AGM that prevents
K(Φ) = K(Φ ∗ α− α).
2.1 Semantic properties
We now provide conditions in semantic terms on revisions
of epistemic states. The following lay conditions on the
positions of valuations by revision.
• (S1) MΦ(¬α) ⊆MΦ∗α(¬α)
• (S2) MΦ∗α(¬α) ⊆MΦ(¬α)
The semantic properties taken together state an equality be-
tween the minimal models of¬α in the epistemic state prior
to revision and after revision. (S1) and (S2) taken together
state that these minimal models of ¬α retain their position
after revision by α. For ease of statement of Theorem 1 be-
low, we state these properties as two separate containments
rather than the implied equality. The property stated here
is straightforward. Consider the minimal models of ¬α in
the total preorder associated with the epistemic state; these
might or might not be included in the minimal models of
the total preorder itself. After revision by α, the minimal
models of the ordering cannot contain any ¬α models. So
the minimal models of ¬α are either demoted in the order-
ing or stay where they are. Whatever be the case, no models
of ¬α can be promoted in the ordering to join the old min-
imal models of ¬α and furthermore, none of the minimal
models of ¬α are demoted. Revision by α can increase
the plausibility of α and decrease that of ¬α; it certainly
cannot increase the plausibility of ¬α. Remarkably, this
simple condition provides all the semantic linkage we need
with the numerous syntactic properties (R1-6, R8-9) stated
above. It should be clear that the semantic properties stated
above are a weaker version of the (C2) postulate since in
the Darwiche-Pearl framework, which relies on a form of
Spohnian conditioning [16], the position of all ¬α models
is determined in the new epistemic state (via pointwise de-
crease in their plausibility by one rank after revision by α,
thus preserving their relative ordering in the new epistemic
state) whereas in our condition, we simply specify the min-
imal models of ¬α in the new epistemic state. Strength-
ening these postulates is possible, but possibly counterpro-
ductive and in any case, it is not our present concern.
Theorem 1 Let ∗ and
.
− be belief change operations on
epistemic states satisfying the reformulated AGM postu-
lates.
1. ∗ and
.
− satisfy (R1) iff ∗ satisfies (S1).
2. ∗ and
.
− satisfy (R2)-(R4) iff ∗ satisfies (S2).
Proof:
1. (S1) follows immediately from (R1). Suppose (S1)
and pick a u ∈M(K(Φ−α)). If u ∈M(α) then u ∈
M(K(Φ ∗ α− α)) by AGM. If u ∈M(¬α) then u ∈
MΦ(¬α). By (S1), u ∈ MΦ∗α(¬α). Therefore
u ∈M(K(Φ ∗ α− α)).
2. Suppose (S2). Now suppose α,¬α /∈ K(Φ). Pick
a u ∈ M(K(Φ ∗ α − α)). If u ∈ M(α) then u ∈
M(K(Φ)) by AGM. Otherwise u ∈ M(K(Φ)) by
(S2). So (R2) holds. Now suppose α /∈ K(Φ). Pick a
u ∈M(K(Φ∗α∗¬α)). Since u ∈M(¬α) it follows
that u ∈M(K(Φ)) by (S2). So (R3) holds. Now sup-
pose α ∈ K(Φ). Pick a u ∈ M(K(Φ ∗ α − α)). If
u ∈ M(α) then u ∈ M(K(Φ)) by AGM. Otherwise
u ∈ M(K(Φ)) by (S2). So (R4) holds. Conversely,
suppose (R2)-(R4). If α,¬α /∈ K(Φ) then (S2) fol-
lows from (R2). If ¬α ∈ K(Φ) then (S2) follows
from (R3). If α ∈ K(Φ) then (S2) follows from (R4).
The following shows that the case we were interested in,
the relationship between K(Φ ∗ α − α) = K(Φ − α) is
one of equality in the case when ¬α is not contained in the
original knowledge base.
Corollary 1 ¿From (R1)-(R4) it follows that, if ¬α /∈
K(Φ) then K(Φ ∗ α− α) = K(Φ− α).
Proof: Follows from (S1) and (S2), which state together
that MΦ∗α(¬α) =MΦ(¬α).
Furthermore, note that since and
.
− are operations that sat-
isfy the reformulated AGM postulates, it follows that they
satisfy (R5), (R6), (R8) and (R9) as well.
2.2 C2 and the new recovery postulates
The connections between (S1), (S2) and (C2) are interest-
ing. Objections to (C2) rely on the observation that revising
a belief state ψ with a sentence of the form p1 ∧ p2 ∧ . . . ∧
pn ∧ q followed by a revision with ¬q reduces to revision
with ¬q. Thus the (potentially useful) belief in the conjunct
p1∧p2∧ . . .∧pn is discarded (unless it was believed in the
first place) even though it does not in itself contradict ¬q.
It can be argued that these criticisms of the (C2) postulate
are somewhat unfair, since this unintuitive outcome does
not follow if revision by p1 ∧ p2 ∧ . . . ∧ pn ∧ q is replaced
by a sequence of revisions by each of the conjuncts. One
would revise with the full conjunction only if these beliefs
were somehow implicitly related. One scenario where this
behaviour required by the (C2) postulate appears to be fully
justified is when a source provides p1 ∧ p2 ∧ . . .∧ pn∧ q as
an input, and subsequently changes its mind (thus revising
by ¬q). In a similar vein, if two consecutive sensor read-
ings contradict each other, it makes more sense to believe
the more recent reading, even if the previous reading pro-
vided additional information. The (C2) postulate has also
been criticized from other perspectives. Cantwell [3] uses a
version of the George-the-criminal example to criticize the
(C2) postulate. We note that it is possible to argue against
Cantwell’s criticism along similar lines to our arguments
against the Cleopatra example (if the inputs come from the
same source, then the outcomes are intuitive, while inputs
from different sources would appear as distinct sentences,
making the example redundant).
The following example, a variation of the George-the-
criminal setting, makes clear that (C2) is too strong,
and that (S1) and (S2) are useful alternative weaken-
ings. Assume that we start by believing George is an
armed robber. Our friend the police detective tells us
that this is incorrect, since no criminal records can be
found for George. Subsequently, she corrects her original
statement—she did find a criminal dossier on George at
police headquarters (it had been misplaced) and given its
location, it could have only come off the stack of files for
people convicted of illegal gun possession or the stack of
convicted shoplifters’ dossiers. We must now revise our
beliefs with the information that George is not an armed
robber, but either a shoplifter or a person convicted of
illegal gun possession. We construct below a scenario
where the (C2) postulate forces us to believe that George
was convicted of illegal gun possession (clearly too strong
given the available evidence). We let r denote ‘George is
an armed robber’, g denote ‘George has been convicted of
illegal gun possession’ and s denote ‘George is a convicted
shoplifter’ and use c as an abbreviation for ‘George is a
criminal’ i.e., r ∨ g ∨ s. Given the propositional language
{r, g, s}, we will represent models as sequences of 0’s and
1’s, representing the valuations of r, g and s respectively
(thus 100 represents a model in which r is true and g
and s are false). We assume for the sake of explanatory
convenience that epistemic states map valuations to natural
numbers with the minimal models being identified as
those assigned the lowest rank (not necessarily 0)—thus
inducing a total preorder on valuations. Let the initial
epistemic state Φ1 be defined as follows:
Φ1(100) = Φ1(101) = Φ1(110) = Φ1(111) = 0
Φ1(010) = Φ1(011) = 1
Φ1(000) = Φ1(001) = 2
Observe that, next to the models of r, we believe the
models of g to be most plausible, reflecting the intuition
that if George is not an armed robber, then the next most
likely scenario is where George is in illegal possession of
firearms. To satisfy (C2) the epistemic state Φ2 = Φ1 ∗ ¬c
must appear as follows:
Φ2(000) = 0
Φ2(100) = Φ2(101) = Φ2(110) = Φ2(111) = 1
Φ2(010) = Φ2(011) = 2
Φ2(001) = 3
This leads to the epistemic state Φ3 = Φ2 ∗ ¬r ∧ (g ∨ s)
where:
Φ3(010) = Φ3(011) = 0
Φ3(000) = 1
Φ3(100) = Φ3(101) = Φ3(110) = Φ3(111) = 2
Φ2(001) = 3
Observe that g ∈ K(Φ3), i.e., we are forced to believe
George has been convicted of illegal gun possession. If we
relax (C2) with (S1) and (S2), a permissible outcome of
revising Φ1 by ¬c is the epistemic state Φ′2 where:
Φ′
2
(000) = 0
Φ′2(100) = Φ
′
2(101) = Φ
′
2(110) = Φ
′
2(111) = 1
Φ′
2
(010) = Φ′
2
(011) = Φ′
2
(001) = 2
Further revising with ¬r ∧ (g ∨ s) gives us the epistemic
state Φ′
3
where:
Φ′3(010) = Φ
′
3(011) = Φ
′
3(001) = 0
Φ′
3
(000) = 1
Φ′3(100) = Φ
′
3(101) = Φ
′
3(110) = Φ
′
3(111) = 2
Notice that g 6∈ K(Φ3).
3 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown how the intuitions underlying
the axiom of recovery can be rescued by paying attention to
the assumptions underlying putative counterexamples. We
argued that the axiom of recovery places an important ra-
tionality constraint on iterated revision, a framework that
requires that we think of revision as taking place on epis-
temic states which encode preferences rather than just flat
belief sets. We believe the connection between the axiom
of recovery and the (C2) postulate of Darwiche-Pearl to be
an interesting one. For future work it might be interesting
to try and obtain a weakened version of the (C1) postulate
in a way that is similar to what we have done in this paper.
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